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Deterministic simulations with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s core FPS 
model show how New Zealand’s broad macroeconomic environment might have 
evolved over the 1990s, if a US nominal yield curve and US TWI exchange rate 
movements under a common currency arrangement had been experienced. 
Relatively looser monetary conditions would have prevailed, and led to 
modest short-run output gains, greater excess demand pressures, noticeably higher 
CPI inflation rates over the whole of the 1990s, and less favourable trade balance 
outcomes, especially for the late 1990s. 
These macroeconomic outcomes are overall less favourable than those 




E58, F36, E31, E37, E17. 
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There has been considerable debate recently on whether New Zealand should 
continue to maintain an independent currency, enter into a monetary union with 
Australia, or adopt the Australian or US dollar as its currency
2. 
From an international perspective, the key arguments for and against 
abandoning independent national currencies and monetary policies have varied 
considerably over time and by country
3. 
For New Zealand, however, Drew et al. (DHMS), (2001, p 3) have suggested 
that a key driving force behind recent debates has been the conduct of monetary 
policy and improved overall performance of the economy in the longer term, rather 
than dissatisfaction with its floating exchange rate system. 
DHMS have also utilised the core model of the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand’s Forecasting and Policy System (FPS) to provide insights into the 
implications for New Zealand’s inflation and output performance, had it credibly 
fixed its currency to the Australian dollar (AUD) over the 1990s. Their historical 
deterministic simulations show that if New Zealand had faced the relatively looser 
Australian monetary conditions, then output growth might have been temporarily 
boosted, but annual inflation would on average have been around 1 percentage point 
higher. Stochastic simulation results show that the volatility in output and inflation 
could have been greater under an AUD common currency policy environment than 
with New Zealand operating its own monetary policy. 
                                                 
2  An evaluation of the key underpinning research can be found in Bjorksten (2001). See also Drew et 
al. (DHMS) (2001), Coleman (2001), (1999); Hartley (2001); Bowden (2000); Grimes (2000); 
Grimes, Holmes, and Bowden (2000); McCaw and McDermott (2000); and Hargreaves and 
McDermott (1999). 
3  Bjorksten (2001) provides examples from the Swedish, Finnish and Canadian debates, emphasising 
that any decision to join a currency union or adopt another country’s currency is predominantly 
political. He categorises the various arguments on: (i) “traditional” Optimal Currency Area (OCA) 
grounds featuring welfare gains from increased trade; (ii) “new” OCA grounds such as removal of 
currency risk premia in interest rates, improved portfolio allocation associated with more 
sophisticated financial capital markets and elimination of home bias; and (iii) crisis avoidance 
grounds. DHMS refer to the key factor behind currency union in Europe being the desire for tighter 
political union, and the driving forces in Latin America being dissatisfaction with floating exchange 
rates and a lack of monetary and inflationary control. 
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Hence, an overall conclusion from these results rests on the relative weighting 
assigned to the potentially modest output gains, the persistent extra inflation costs, 
and the greater output and inflation variability. For example, placing a high weight on 
minimising output and inflation variability implies the New Zealand dollar (NZD) 
should not be fixed to the AUD, and New Zealand should retain its ability to set 
monetary policy independent of that set in Australia.
4  
However, while Australia accounts for around 20 per cent of New Zealand’s 
exports and is its largest and geographically closest trading partner, New Zealand has 
no single dominant merchandise trading partner. Other trading partners of significance 
are the United States (US), Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Republic of 
Korea, the People’s Republic of China, and Taiwan. Moreover, Bowden (2000) has 
suggested that at least 50 per cent of New Zealand’s market traded commodity exports 
tend to be priced in US dollars (USD). This makes the US dollar New Zealand’s 
largest trading currency and the US one of its top three merchandise-trading partners. 
Bowden has presented key arguments for and against adopting some form of USD 
currency arrangement
5. Hartley (2001), as part of his extensive review of monetary 
arrangements in New Zealand, has also canvassed potential costs and benefits from 
New Zealand’s abandoning its national currency and adopting the USD as its 
domestic currency. 
The primary aim of this short paper is to present counterfactual deterministic 
simulation results for 1990 to 1999, to see whether New Zealand could have had 
cyclically better inflation, output and trade balance outcomes from facing US interest 
rate and currency movements. It also provides insights from a macroeconomic 
perspective on the relative merits of adopting a common currency with the US rather 
than Australia
6.  Our methodology is the same as that used in DHMS for the AUD, 
and the empirical results should be seen as complementing the judgements put 
                                                 
4    In this context, it can be noted that section 4(b) of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s September 
2002 Policy Targets Agreement (PTA), Cullen and Bollard, (2002), requires that “In pursuing its 
price stability objective, the Bank shall implement monetary policy in a sustainable, consistent and 
transparent manner and shall seek to avoid unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and the 
exchange rate.” 
5    The arguments focus on currency-based transactions costs and exposure uncertainty, portfolio 
impediments and interest rate risk premiums, exchange rate buffering or anti-buffering effects, and 
political factors. 
6  
forward in Bowden (2000), Grimes (2000), Hartley (2001) and others, as to whether 
New Zealand should adopt a common currency with the United States or not. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the 
methodology used, and the historical US monetary conditions imposed. Section 3 
presents the counterfactual empirical results for inflation, output and the nominal 
trade balance, benchmarked against the actual New Zealand and counterfactual 
Australian outcomes. Specific results are summarised in Section 4, and some broader 
monetary policy implications are drawn. 
2  THE COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS 
2.1 Methodology 
Deterministic simulations were carried out with the RBNZ’s FPS core model
7, 
and when interpreting them three factors should be borne in mind. Firstly, the 
utilisation of core FPS for both common currency and non-common currency regimes 
implies that structural changes and alterations to the economy’s long-run steady state 
properties would take place only very slowly over time. In other words, FPS is 
assumed to be a reasonably valid reflection of the economy, whether New Zealand 
were running a common currency or not
8. Secondly, as is the case for most small open 
economy macro models, monetary policy is assumed to affect nominal but not real 
variables in the long run, and can have significant effects on real activity over short to 
medium terms. Thirdly, results from deterministic simulations for New Zealand over 
the 1990s provide counterfactual outcomes solely for that particular historical 
experience. 
                                                                                                                                            
6  Note that, as was the case in the DHMS research, any microeconomic gains of a common currency 
are not included in this analysis. 
7  A succinct overview of that model has been presented in DHMS (2001, Appendix). More complete 
descriptions are available in Black et al. (1997), and Hunt, Rose and Scott (2000). 
8    For a fuller appreciation of long run outcomes, a possibly important omission from this 
macroeconomic based analysis could be our not accounting explicitly for potentially significant gains 
to trade. These could result from reduced financial transactions costs, and the removal of exchange 
rate uncertainty as non-tariff barriers to exporting by smaller firms. See Grimes (2000). 
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However, despite New Zealand, Australia and the US having traditionally 
experienced quite strongly synchronised business cycles
9, New Zealand has 
experienced a number of materially different domestic and foreign shocks, and 
experienced quite wide-ranging movements in interest rates and exchange rates over 
the 1990s. The deterministic results presented here are therefore considered 
sufficiently representative to be informative. But if additionally, one needs an 
appreciation of the outcomes from a fuller range of potential economic shocks to the 
New Zealand economy, then stochastic simulations of the type undertaken by DHMS  
for the Australian counterfactual would have to be carried out. Stochastic simulation 
analysis is not, however, within the scope of this paper. 
2.2  The historical US monetary conditions 
FPS was simulated from September 1983 to December 1999, with US 
monetary conditions imposed from March 1990 to December 1999.  These US 
monetary conditions reflect an exogenously imposed nominal yield curve (Figure 1) 
and an exogenous nominal exchange rate growing at the same rate as the US TWI 
(Figure 3)
10  
US nominal long interest rates were lower than those for NZ throughout the 
1990s (Figure 2), and the US yield curve would have provided considerably looser 
interest rate settings over almost all that period
11. Moreover, for the first half of the 
1990s, these interest rate settings would have contributed to more stimulatory 
monetary conditions than those provided from Australian settings. 
NZ experienced relatively large nominal exchange rate movements over the 
1990s, appreciating markedly from 1992 to 1997, and depreciating quite rapidly from 
1997 onwards (Figure 3). A NZ TWI tuned to the US TWI would also have 
appreciated markedly from 1995 to 1999, but overall would not have led to a 
consistently lower nominal effective exchange rate. 
                                                 
9  See Hall, Kim and Buckle (1998), Grimes, Holmes and Bowden (2000), and McCaw and McDermott 
(2000). 
10 The Bank of England’s US TWI was used. 
11  On average, the US yield curve is approximately 150 basis points more stimulatory.   
8  
But what of real effective exchange rate movements, which are computed 
endogenously in FPS? Figure 4 shows the real TWI exchange rate actually faced by 
NZ, together with those which NZ would have faced from both US and AUS nominal 
exchange rate movements. Inheriting Australian exchange rate movements would 
have led to a lower real TWI over the great bulk of the 1990s, but the US real TWI 
displays significantly different movements and is likely to have generated 
considerably different outcomes. It would have been considerably less favourable to 
exporters and potentially more beneficial to NZ’s inflation rate between 1992 and 
1994, and in an even more pronounced fashion from mid-1997 onwards. 
Hence, the combination of NZ adopting a US yield curve and US TWI 
movements would almost certainly have led to looser monetary conditions. The “on 
balance” macroeconomic outcomes for inflation, output and the nominal trade balance 
would not, however, seem a priori as clear cut as those that could be expected from 
imposing Australian conditions. 
3 EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
Under US monetary conditions, the estimated output gap would have been on 
average around 0.4 percentage points higher over the 1990s, compared with NZ’s 
historical experience (Figure 5). This is only marginally higher than the 0.3 
percentage points reported for Australian monetary conditions. The output gains are 
similar for both currency regimes from 1995 through to 1998, but adopting the US 
dollar could have produced somewhat less unfavourable growth outcomes from early 
1991 through to late 1993. The associated deficient demand pressures would have 
been correspondingly less for this sub-period. 
The somewhat higher levels of activity, associated with relatively looser 
monetary conditions for most of the period, generate the CPI inflation outcomes in 
Figure 6. Under US monetary conditions, annual inflation would have been noticeably 
higher over the whole of the 1990s, and between 1 and 1.5 percentage points higher 
from 1995 onwards. Peak inflation would have been 3.6 per cent for the year ended 
December 1996, falling to about 2.4 per cent by the end of the 1990s. 
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These outcomes are considerably less favourable than those emanating from 
Australian counterfactual conditions, and substantially worse than those obtained 
under actual New Zealand monetary conditions. The Reserve Bank’s then CPI 
inflation target band of 0 to 2 per cent would have been exceeded as early as 
December 1992, and would have persisted for a much longer time period than under 
Australian conditions. The subsequent 0 to 3 per cent target band, agreed to from the 
December 1996 year, would also have been exceeded, initially from March 1995, and 
then by a materially greater amount and for a longer period than from Australian 
conditions. In short, considerably less favourable inflation outcomes would have 
resulted from US monetary conditions. 
Adopting the USD is likely to have led to a considerably worse nominal trade 
balance overall (Figure 7), coinciding particularly with the effects over 1997 to 1999 
from the Asian financial crisis and New Zealand’s two successive periods of 
drought
12. This outcome contrasts with the modestly better trade balance overall that 
might have occurred from adoption of the Australian dollar. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The more stimulatory monetary conditions associated with a nominal US yield 
curve and US TWI exchange rate movements have been applied to New Zealand’s 
economic conditions of the 1990s. 
Deterministic simulations show New Zealand’s output gap measure to have 
been on average 0.4 percentage points higher, only marginally better than the modest 
0.3 percentage points improvement obtained from adopting Australian monetary 
conditions. 
                                                 
12 See ‘Business cycle developments and the role of monetary policy over the 1990s’, pp 54-77 in 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2000). 
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The somewhat stronger excess demand pressure would, however, have 
produced noticeably higher CPI inflation throughout the 1990s. Annual inflation 
would have been 1 to 1.5 percentage points higher from 1995, peaking at 3.6 per cent 
for the year ended December 1996. These outcomes under US monetary conditions 
are considerably less favourable than those obtained from Australian counterfactual 
conditions, and might have raised concerns quite early in the 1990s about the 
possibility of ongoing higher inflationary expectations. 
Movements in the US dollar relative to the NZ dollar in the late 1990s would 
have led to a substantially greater nominal trade deficit than would have occurred 
from adoption of the Australian dollar, or was historically the case for New Zealand. 
Or put another way, the inability of New Zealand to operate its own monetary policy 
in response to the Asian financial crisis could have been associated with significantly 
more negative trade balances. 
Hence, under US monetary conditions of the 1990s, key cyclical consequences 
are that New Zealand could have had modest short-run output gains, greater excess 
demand pressures, noticeably higher CPI inflation rates sustained over the whole of 
the 1990s, and less favourable trade balance outcomes. 
These macroeconomic outcomes are overall less favourable than those 
obtained from adopting the equivalent Australian monetary conditions, and in the 
context of the counterfactual monetary conditions of the 1990s are consistent with 
New Zealand retaining its ability to set monetary policy independent of that set in 
Australia or the US. 
However, as the FPS macroeconomic model does not allow for either 
structural  changes or new steady state values which might emerge over the longer 
term under a common currency regime, a fuller judgement on monetary policy 
implications should ideally reflect future exploration of these issues as well. 
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Figure 5: Output gaps 
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